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EYING THE PROMISED LAND: THE WEARISOME 
QUEST FOR AN EFFECTIVE REGIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS ENFORCEME1\1T MECHANISM IN AFRICA 
By 
Nsongurua Udombana • 
"There is no prestige for a king who has no queen." 
African Proverb 
:fritroductory: Why Courts Matter 
~gional human rights regimes complement national systems, 
which sometimes suffer from "[i]nept, inefficient, under-
resourced, or iniquitous governments incapable of, or perhaps 
even opposed to, assisting citizens' realization of their human 
rights" .1Regional systems also complement the global ·system, 
which often is problematic in achieving consensus due to 
multiplicity of states and the absence of homogeneity. "As far 
as their proc~sses are concerned", notes Sarkin, "regional 
systems for many reasons are more accessible, cheaper for 
litigants, and moreeffective in the work they do than 
international courts". 2 However, the national, regional and 
international regimes all share a common goal in protecting the 
fundamental values that human rights embody: dignity, 
respect, liberty, equality, freedom, justice, non-discrimination, 
1. Margaux Hall & David Weiss: "Human Rights and Remedial Equilibration: 
Equilibrating Socioeconomic Rights" (2010-2011) 36 Brook J lnt'l L 453' at 
454. 
2. Jeremy Sarkin, "Evaluating the African Commission on Human and 
People's [sic] Rights and the New African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights with Comparative Lessons from the Council of Europe and the 
Organization of American States''. (2008) 1 Inter-Am &Eur Hum Rts / 199 at 
210. ' . . . '' 
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etal. Protecting these values entail mutual commitment among 
the global community, which explains why human rights give 
rise to ergaomnesobligations, as the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) explained in Barcelona Tracton, Light and Power 
· Co Ltd (Belg v Spain). 3 
Ironically, state sovereignty is still the dogma of 
international law. It is states that violate human rights; it is 
states that elaborate international law; and it is states that 
determine what mechanisms should be established to inquire 
into their compliance with their legal obligations. The coercing 
power of international law lies in the wi_llingness of states to 
limit their sovereignties. This probably explains why voluntary 
compliance by states to their human rights obligations has been 
generally weak. Although there is no fool-proof mechanism of 
accountability, courts remain the handmaidens of the human 
rights system. International complaint procedures, in particular 
regional ones, serve important functions: 
First, as a result of considering such a complaint an 
individual, whose rights have been violated, may have a 
remedy against the wrong suffered by him, and the violation 
could be stopped and/or compensation paid, etc; second, 
consideration of a complaint may result not only in a remedy 
for the victim of the violation, whose complaint has been 
considered, but also in changes to internal legislation and 
practice; and third, an individual complaint (or more often, a 
series of complaints) may serve as evidence of systematic 
and/or massive violations of certain rights in a given country .4 
3. Barcelona Tracton, Light and Power Co. Ltd (Belg v. Spain), 1970 ICJ 4, 
para 32 (singling out obligations as including those derived "from the 
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, 
including protection from slavery and racial discrimination"). 
4. Rein Mullerson, "The Efficiency of the Individual Complaint Procedures: 
The Experience of CCPR, CERD, CAT and ECHR" in ArieBloedet aleds, 
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Further, experiences in other regions show that judicial 
mechanisms are better suited to change states' conducts than 
diplomatic or even quasi-judicial bodies. 5 The European 
system is the light bearer in this regards.6 "The European 
model of economic and human rights law,'' according to 
Baudenbacher, "is characterized by a high degree of 
judicialization that materialized in judicial independence, broad 
access to justice for individuals , dynamic interpretation, and-
in the case. of the Luxemburg courts- direct effect and a right 
to compensation in the event of serious violation of European 
law by national governments;, .7 Diplomatic models of conflict 
. . 
resolution have many limitations: They act behind closed doors 
in order to secure confidentiality; they are under no obligation 
to decide, nor are they obliged to state reasons; they are not 
bound by precedent; the only players are governments; there is 
a strong element of consensus (and also of political' and 
economic pressure); and enforcement of diplomatic outcomes 
may be a problem. 8Ad hoe arbitral tribunals may be closer to 
courts than diplomatic panels, but they are usually established . 
for a concrete case whose facts have already occurred. 
Besides, some members of a panel may be close to one party, 
Monitoring Human Rights in Europe (Boston-London: Dordrecht, 1993) 25 
at 27. 
5. Sarkin, supra note 2 at 210 (noting that regional courts "arc more likely to 
achieve greater enforceability of their decisions partly because of the 
political will, at least in some regions, to do so by the regional system 
itselr'). 
6. M. Janis, R. Kay &A. Bradley: European Human Rights Law (New. York: 
Oxford Univ . Press, 1995) at 3 (arguing that the European system is the 
"most successful system of international law for the protection of human · 
rights"). 
7. Carl Baudenbacher, "J udicialization: Can the European Model Be Exported 
to Other Parts of the World" (2003-2004) 39 Texas Int 'l LJ 381.at 397. 
8. Ibid at 282. / 
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which may compromise its transparency. 9 Finally, quasi-
judicial bodies, like the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights [African Conunission], use procedures that do 
not meet the higher legal thresholds of a court. 
One plausible reason for courts' unique authorities could be 
that they posses certain distinctive and even exclusive 
attributes that are not conferred on diplomatic and other ad hoe 
models of conflict resolution. Courts are uniquely empowered 
to determine legal rights and offer remedies, perhaps because 
of their relative insulation from political pressures or their 
~nhanced ability_ to discern legal principles . 10 The declaratory, 
de~erminative, and adjudicatory functions may not be the 
exclusive characteristics of judicial power, but the power to 
pronrn,mce authoritatively and conclusively on what the law is, 
to determine the legal rights and liabilities of contestants as 
they e?<"-ist, and to impose a binding and enforceable obligation 
are distinctively and exclusively judicial functions. 11 
, International law generally is often criticised as being weak 
by not offering effective enforcement mechanisms. A fortiori, 
~<:: · African regional human rights system has often been 
criticised for its weakness and ineffectiveness particularly as it 
lacks an ~stitution capable of giving enforceable decisions .. 
Assuming the validity of these criticisms, then states should 
strive to increase the strength, credibility and 'compliance pull ' 
9. Ibid. 
10. Daryl Levinson, "Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration" (1999)99 
Colum L Rev 857 at 861. Catherine Turnert: "Human Rights and the Empire 
of (International) Law" (2011) 29 Law & Ineq 313 at 325 (arguing that the 
advantage of legal form is viewed in terms of impartiality and procedural 
regularity that law brings to bear on difficult situations). 
11. B. 0. Nwabueze: .ludicialism in Commonwealth Africa (London: C. Hurst & 
Co, 1977) at 10- 13. 
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of their agreements .12 yet, as the omission of a court from the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights13 shows, states 
routinely fail to draft treaties that maximise the credibility of 
their promises. The omission of a court from Africa's regional 
human rights milieu has weakened the force and credibility of 
states' commitments to human rights protection in Africa. It 
has stymied the growth of human rights, diminished 
compliance of states to their treaty obligations, and robbed 
Africa of robust human rights jurisprudence. As presently 
con~tituted, the African Commission is not the, not. even a, 
firewall against human rights abuses. 
One argument for the non-inclusion of a court in the 
African human rights system was a bland appeal to African 
tradition, which promotes amicable and conciliatory methods 
for settling disputes as opposed to the adversarial methods of 
·the West. 14 Those who hold this view point to such peaceful 
mechanisms as the Commission on Mediation Conciliation and 
Arbitration, established by the erstwhile Organization of 
.African Unity (OAU)in 1964, and the Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution of 1993 - moribund 
institutions that are now replaced by the African Union's (AU) 
Peace and Security Council (PSC). The African Charter itself 
encourages such a method of settlement, albeit in relation to 
inter-state communications.15 However, this appeal to 
12. Andrew Guzman: "The Design of International Agreements" (2005) 16 Eur 
J Im'l L 579 at 580-581 (exploring the challenging dynamic that drafters 
face in managing acceptance and enforceability of international treaties). 
13. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted 27 June· ·1981, 
entry into force 21 Oct. 1986, Doc OAU/CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev5 (1982) 21 
ILM 59 [African Charter] . 
14. PM Munya: "The International Court of Justice and Peaceful Settlement of 
African Disputes: Problems, Challenges and Prospects" (2002). I East Afr J 
Inr'l & Comp L 1 4-5. 
15. African Charter, supra note 13 at arts 47 and 48. 
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' tradition ' has never been convincing, considering that the 
post-colonial African states have embraced adversarial justice 
systems and the judicial and quasi-proceeding of UN 
institutions, including the ICJ.16 As Kindiki rightly argues, " if 
it is accepted that it is (or was) culturally detestable for 
Africans to use the judicial system, then, African states should 
have immediately after independence dismantled the elaborate 
judicial structures bequeathed to them by the colonial masters, 
to replace them with consensual systems. "17 
A more plausible reason for the non-inclusion of a court in 
the African Charter was sovereign pride. A~ican States, at the 
time, were not willing to submit their sovereignty to a 
supranational judicial body with powers to make binding 
orders against them. 18 These states failed to recognize that the 
human rights movement had extended the boundaries of 
normativity in international legal discourse. 19 They were 
16. E Diarra, "De l'Europe a l' Afrique: Le ModeleEurop4enne est-il 
Exportable?" in P Tavernier, ed, Quele Europe pour Les Droits de 
l'Homme(Brusscls: Bruylant, 1996) 407 at 437-438. 
17. KithureKindiki, "The Proposed Integration of the African Court of Justice 
and the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights: Legal Difficulties and 
Merits" (2007) 15 Afr J lnt 'l & Comp L 138 at 139 (noting the "(s]cientific, 
empirical evidence [that] exists to show that informal mechanisms of dispute 
resolution based on negotiation and consensus co-existed with indigenous 
courts administering traditional justice in pre-colonial African societies"); 
Taslim Elias, Nature of African Customary law (3rded, Manchester Univ 
Press, 1972) (a seminal work that attempts to negate a number of 
patronizing misconceptions concerning African law); EA Keay & SS 
Richardson, eds, Tile Native and Custommy Courts of Nigeria (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1966). 
18. ·Raymond Sock, "The Case for an African Court of Human and People's 
Rights: From a Concept to a Draft Protocol over 33 Years", Afr Topics, 
Mar-Apr 1994 at 9 (observing that the group of experts that met in Darkar, 
Senegal, under the Chair of Justice Keba Mbaye , was given a set of 
overriding principles, one of which was that they should not exceed what 
African states may be willing to accept). 
19. Henry Steiner, " Human Rights: The Deepening Footprint" (2007) 20 Harv 
Hum Rts J 7 at 12 ("[T]he stunning achievement of the movement since its 
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steeped in the Westphalian - state-centric - . tradition20and 
tended to regard international concern for their human rights 
records as a pretext for undermining their cherished 
sovereignty. 21This fear of supranational bodies meant that 
implementation of the African Charter's provisions remains 
essentially a matter of domestic jurisdiction; and a few willing 
states have transformed the Charter into domestic law. Even 
presently, there is still a general reluctance by African states to 
sufficiently empower their regional and sub-regional judicial 
and quasi-judicial mechanisms. ,In the human rights field, 
states seem comfortable with a non-judicial Commission or 
Committee that make endless recommendations those 
governments ignore with ignominy. 22 In sum, the absence of a 
legitimate and robust judicial institution for human rights 
accountability has resulted in a culture of impunity in Africa. 
To deflate these criticisms, African states started adopting 
specific protocols to establish some specialised regional courts, 
inception, but particularly of the last decades[,] has been the deep 
institutionalization of a new discourse for much of the world"). 
20. The erstwhile Organization of African Unity (OA U) placed strong emphasis 
on the reserve domain doctrine, which contributed to the Member States' 
reluctance to take human rights seriously and their persistent unwillingness 
to criticize one another, even in the face of flagrant human rights abuses; 
UO Umozurike: "The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the OA U Charter" 
(1979) 78 AfrA!f 197 at 202 (noting, "with regard to breaches of human 
rights, even of a grave nature such as genocide, the OAU has been bogged 
down by the domestic jurisdiction clause"). 
21. G Naldi, "Futur~ Trends of Human Rights in Africa" in Michael Evans & 
Rachel Murray eds: The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: 
T71e System in Practice, 1986-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press, 
2002) l at 2-5. 
22. George Wachira _& Abiola Ayinda: "Twenty Years of Elusive Enforcement 
of the Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights: A Possible.Remedy" (2006) 6(2) Afr Hum Rts LI 465. 
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first in 1998,23 then in 2003,24 and finally(?) in 2008. The 
Human Rights Protocol is specific to human rights;25the ACJ 
Protocol is generic in its mandate. 26 Some AU Member States 
are parties to one or more of these protocols; others are not. 
For example, not all states parties to the 1998 Protocol are 
parties to the 2003 Protocol ·or , for that matter, the 2008 
Protocol. It will be interesting to see how the future court will 
resolve conflicting issues arising from these multiple treaties. 
What is obvious is that, in terms of effective regional human 
rights enforcement mechanism in Africa, Africa's continental 
organisations have trea.ted Africans to a drama that, so far, is 
playing out in three acts. 
This paper traces these wearisome trajectories and 
questions if Africans are doomed to wait in perpetuity for a 
virile court to interpret and enforce the African Charter and 
other relevant human rights treaties? Parts two to four spotlight 
and analyse the contexts and contents of the various treaties 
aimed at effective regional judicial mechanism for human 
rights accountability in Africa. The final part and the 
23 . Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights Establishing 
an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 9, 1998, OAU Doc 
OA U/LEG/EXP/ AFCHPR/PROT(III) [H11111a11 Rights Protocolj. The 
African Charter permits its States Parties to adopt special protocols or 
agreements to supplement its provisions, if necessary. African Charter, 
supra note 13 at art 66. 
24. Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, adopted July 11, 2003 
(entry into force Feb 11, 2009) [ACJ Protocol]; K Magliveras & G Naldi, 
"The African Cour t of Justice" (2006) 66 Heidelberg J /nt'L L 187. 
25. The Human Rights Protocol envisages its Court to complement the 
protective mandate of the African Commission. Human Rights Protocol, 
supra note 23at art 2. The Protocol, thus, anticipates cooperation and 
consultation between the two human rights bodies. 
26. The jurisdiction of the ACJ covers, imer alia, over all cases relating to 
interpretation or application of the Act and all other treaties adopted within 
the framework of the AU;ACJ Protocol, supra note 24 at art 26. 
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conclusion reflect on the challenges still facing the African 
human rights system and offer a few recommendations. 
Towards a Unified Regional Court 
The consensus during the drafting of the ACJ Protocol was 
that that the African Human Rights Court "shall remain a 
separate and distinct institution from the Court of Justice of the 
African Union" .27However, several legal and practical 
questions arising from the proposed dual courts remained 
unanswere~, questions relating to 'why', 'what', 'how.', 
'when', and 'where': Why does Africa need two continental 
courts; or is it a case of blindly following . the European 
example? What facilities exist to support two regional courts, 
given the inadequate funding of existing continental 
institutions? When will the courts become operational and 
where will their seats be located? How -will these courts 
manage possible jurisdictional conflicts, given that the ACJ 
Protocol mandates the ACJ to interpret all continental ~eaties, 
n:ot excluding human rights treaties? As a commentator then 
reasoned: 
International law should develop uniformly in 
the African continent and throughout the 
international legal community. For Africa, 
having two courts is likely to create more 
confusion than benefits. The proposed two 
courts will probably be given both contentious · 
and advisory jurisd°ictions to interpret various 
legal instruments including .. human rights 
treaties; thus, there is a real danger that the two 
27. Decision on the Draft Protocol of the Court of Justice, AU Doc. EX/CL/59 
(III), para 2. 
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bodies might give . conflicting interpretations 
before them and thus create disparate legal 
norms.28 
·Apparently unable to answer , the many questions arising 
from the decision to set up dual supranational courts, the AU 
Assembly, at its 3rd Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, in July 2004, reversed its previous decision and 
accepted a proposal that "the African Court on Human and 
Peoples' Rights and the Court of Justice should be integrated 
into one Court. "29 
Adoption of the Merger Protocol and Its Statute 
The idea to merge the two courts- then as a budget control 
measure-was muted during the negotiation of the draft ACJ 
Protocol. 30 However, states which feared that the exercise 
would relegate human· rights prioritization within the Court 
opposed the idea.310basanjo, then Nigeria's President and 
Chairperson of the · AU Assembly Chairperson, reasoned that 
there was: 
the danger of proliferation of organs of the 
organization and the danger of not having 
28. Nsongurua Udombana, "An African Human Rights Court and an African 
Union Court: A Needful Duality or a Needless Duplication?" (2003) 28(3) 
Brook J Im' l l8, 1 l at 859 [ Udomba11a, "A Needful Duality? '1. 
29. Assembly/AU/Dec.45(Ill) (July 2004), para 4. 
30. Summary of Procedures of the First Mee ting of Experts/Judges and. the PRC 
on the· Draft Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, 22-25 
Apr 2003, Expt.Judg/Draft/Prot/ACJ/Rpt.(I). C.f Ministerial Conference 
on the Draft Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, AU Doc 
Min/Draft/Prot/ACJ/Rpt.(1) (June 2003). 
31. Summary of Proceedings of the Second Meeting of Experts/Judges and PRC 
on the Draft Protocol of the African Court of Justice of the African Union, 
AU Doc Expt.Judg/Draft/Prot/ACJ/Rpt.(II) (June 2003), para 20. 
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enough funds to do what we should do and just 
proliferating organs .... Why shouldn't the Court 
of Justice also take along with it the Court on 
Human and Peoples' Rights so that we have a 
Court of Justice with a division, if you like for 
border issues, a division for human rights issues, 
a division for cross border criminal issues or 
whatever. . .. I will suggest in that case that the 
Decision on the Operationalisation of the African 
Court on Human and Peoples ' Rights should be 
removed for now. Alright? That is done. 32 
It looks like Obasanjo's military and, hence, authoritarian 
background played out at the Summit, as he did not even allow 
his peers to debate his proposal before concluding: "Alright? 
That is done". Nonetheless, his reasoning echoed a similar 
recommendation made by a commentator on the eve of 
adoption of ACJ Protocol in 2003,33 though his views were not 
supported by other commentators who argued that: 
A unified pan-African Court, which is 
purportedly proficient in all areas of law, is 
32. Report on the Decision of the Assembly of the Union to Merge the African 
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Court of Justice of the African 
Union, AU Doc EX.CL/162(VI), para 3. 
33. Udombana, "A Needful Duality?" supra note 28 at 864-865 ("A realistic 
approach is for the AU to establish and strengthen one judicial institution, 
which may be, but not necessarily. the African Human Rights Court ... There 
is an alternative approach ... The AU should establish the AU Courr, not as 
an arm of the AU but as an autonomous institution capable of addressing the 
myriad of problems confronting the continent. The AU Court could have 
different chambers ... Thus, one chamber could be seized with matters of 
international economic law including economic integration, another with 
human rights issues, and still others with environment or international 
criminal law including terrorism, etc"). 
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perhaps not the best forum to handle such 
specialized matters with grave implications on 
the rights and dignity of individuals and groups, 
on the one hand, and the functionalist and 
technocratic process of economic integration, on 
the other. Only a specialized human rights court 
is likely to be more credible to the victims o.f 
human rights violations since it will not only 
have the capacity but will also be seen to have 
the capacity to adjudicate human rights matters 
effectively. 34 
The July 2004 AU Assembly decision to merge the African 
Human Rights Court with the proposed ACJ Court35set in 
motion the drafting process for a merger protocol. Meanwhile, 
the AU Commission recommended that the jurisdiction of the 
two courts should be retained, but that it was possible for one 
court to administer the two protocols through special 
chambers. It further recommended that the necessary 
amendments to both protocols be effected through the adoption 
of a new protocol by the AU Assembly. 36 However, there was 
still the legal problem of how to merge a protocol that had 
already entered into force with one that was still floating, at 
best. A meeting of government legal experts, which met in 
Addis Ababa in March and April of 2005, acknowledged the 
complexities involved in creating an integrated judicial system. 
34. Frans Viljoen & EvaristBaimu: "Courts for Africa: Considering the 
Coexistence of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the 
African Court of Justice" (2004)22 Neth Q Hum Rts 241 at 255. 
35. Assembly Decision on the Seats of the Organs of the African Union, AU 
Doc Assembly/AU/Dec.45 (III) Revl (July 2004). 
36. Coalition for an Effective African Court, About the African Court, online, 
Coalition for an Effective African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights 
< l1ttp:!lwww.africa11co1111coalitio11. orgleditorinl.asp ?page _id= 16>. · 
Eying the Promised Land: Tile Wearisome Quest for an 191 
Effective Regional H11111a11 Rights Enforcement Mechanism in Africa 
It recommended that the operationalization of the African 
Human Rights Court should continue; that the ratification of 
the ACJ Protocol should also continue until it comes into 
force; and that only then should the process to integrate the 
two courts resume. 37 The AU Executive Council approved this 
recommendation at its Abuja Summit in January 2005.38 
At its July 2005 Sununit in Libya, the AU Assembly 
decided to separate the question of establishing the Human 
Rights Court from the question of its merger. with the ACJ. It 
approved the. continuing operationalization of the Human . 
Rights Court pending further reflections by AU legal experts -
in consultation with states - on consequences of the merger. 
The Assembly mandated the AU Chairperson to work out 
modalities to implement the Decision. 39 Working on 
preliminary drafts prepared by Algerian Foreign minister, 
Mohammed Bedjaoui (former President of the ICJ)), the 
Working Group produced a "Draft Protocol on the Integration 
of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the 
Court of Justice of the AU." The Executive Council received 
· the Draft Protocol in January 2006 and asked for comments 
from AU Member States.40 
The Draft Protocol, having received inputs from Member 
States, was submitted to a joint meeting of the Permanent 
Representatives Committee (PRC) and legal experts from 
Member States held in Addis Ababa in May 2006. The issues 
37. Ibid. 
38. Executive Council De'cision on the Merger of lhe African Court and lhe 
Courl of Justice of lhe African Union, AU Doc EX.CL/Dec.165 (VI) (Jan 
2005). 
39. AU Doc Assembly/AU/Dec.83(V) (July 2005). 
40. Executive Council Decision on lhe Merger of the African Court and the 
Court of Justice of the African Union, AU Doc EX.CL/Dec.237 (VIII) (Jan 
2006). 
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that dominated that meeting were, the composition of the 
Merged Court in relation to the number and quorum of judges; 
the geographical representation of judges on the Court; 
whether the AU Assembly would have the power to increase 
the number of judges once the Statute establishing the Court 
entered into force; whether the Assembly would confer special 
jurisdiction on the Court on matters other than those provided 
for in its Statute; and the content of the Court's rules of 
procedure.41 The meeting, nevertheless, prepared the final 
Draft Protocol,42 which it presented to the Executive Council; 
and the Council referred the Draft to the Ministers of Justice 
. . 
and Attorneys-General from Member States, "for finalization 
and submission of a report at the next Ordinary Session of the 
Executive Council, in January 2007 . "43 It was in April 2008 
that the African Justice Ministers considered and approved the 
draft, which was subsequently submitted to the Executive 
·council for approval at its 13'h Ordinary Session. At its 11'h 
Summit in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, in July 2008, the AU 
Assembly adopted the Merger Protocol. 44 
In adopting the Protocol, African leaders recalled "their 
commitment to take all necessary measures to strengthen their 
41. Chaloka Beyani: "Recent Developments in the African Human Rights 
System 2004-2006" (2007) 7 Hum Rts L Rev 582 at 585 [Beyanil] (noting: 
"With consensus seen as the best way of reaching decisions, the Draft 
Protocol offered the benefit of friendly compromises on some of these 
issues"). 
42. Draft Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights, AU Doc EX.CU211 (VIll) Rev.l, Annex II (May 2006) [Draft 
Protocol]. 
43. Report on the Draft Single Legal Instrument on the Merger of the Afri"can 
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Court of Justice of the African 
Union, AU Doc EX.CUDec.283(IX). 
44. Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 
adopted July 2008 (not yet in force), AU Doc Assembly/AU/13{Xl) (2008) 
[Merger Protocol]. The Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights is annexed to the Merger Protocol [Merger Statute]. 
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common institutions and to endow them with the necessary 
powers and resources to carry out their missions effectively. "45 
On the day of its adoption, the Assembly called "on Member 
States to sign and ratify the Protocol . . . as expeditiously as 
possible so as to enable the Protocol to enter into force and 
ensure the speedy operationalization of the merged Court". 46 
The Protocol will enter into force 30 days after the deposit of 
ratification instruments by fifteen States Parties.47 The first 
problem that readily reveals itself is that some States which are 
parties to the Human Rights Protocol, b~t which, for whatever 
reason, do not wish to ratify the Merger Protocol, shall not 
have standing before the new Court. As will be shown shortly, 
personal standing is reserved, inter alia, to States Parties to the 
Merger Protocol, not the earlier ones. 
Explaining the Protocol's Intent 
The Merger Protocol situates the new Court within the 
extended goals of the AU and the African Charter. 48 The Court 
is conceived to "supplement the mandate and efforts of other 
continental treaty bodies as well as national institutions in 
protecting human rights, "49 including the African Commission 
and the African Committee. 50 The Merger Protocol also recalls 
the Women's Protocol,51 which implementation is presently 
vested in the African Commission and the Human Rights 
Court. The Protocol merges the African Human Rights Court 
45. Merger Protocol, supra note 44 at preamble. 
46. Decision on the Single Legal Instrument on the Merger of the African Court 
on Human and Peoples' Rights and the African Court of Justice, AU Doc 
Assembly/AU/13(XI) (July 2008), at para 3. 
47. Merger Protocol, supra note 44at art 9(1). 
48. Ibid at preamble at paras 1 and 2. 
49. lbidatpara 10. 
50. Ibid atpara 5. 
51. Ibid at preamble para 8. 
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and the ACJ Court "into a single Court" known as "The 
Afriqm Court of Justice and Human Rights" ("Merged 
Court").52 The Encarta Dictionary defines the word 'merge' 
as, "to combine or unite with something to form a single 
entity" , or "to blend, or make two or more things blend, 
gradually". In corporate law, a merger is the consolidation of 
two or more corporations into one under the same governing 
organization. Thus, the intent of the Merger Protocol is a 
complete fusion of the institutions and management of the two 
courts into one, with a pool of judges chosen in accordance 
with the provisions of the P~otocol and its annexed Statute. 
Expectedly, the Protocol contains transitional provisions 
relating to the Human Rights Protocol, but there are no 
transitional provisions for the ACJ Protocol, which has now 
entered into force. This omission was preventable; the drafters 
of the Merger Protocol should have foreseen the entry into 
force of the ACJ Protocol, even if not the operationalization of 
the Court. Meanwhile, the terms of office of judges of the 
Human · Rights Court shall end after election of judges of the 
Merged Court, provided that the former judges shall remain in 
office until the new judges are sworn in. 53 This means that, de 
Jure, they cease to be judges after the election of the new 
judges, but de facto, they will continue to handle any pending 
human rights cases until the elected judges of the Merged 
Court are sworn in, which could take an interval of some 
months. This means that a smooth transition of judges of the 
present Human Rights Court to the merged is not guaranteed 
as a matter of course, 54 but it is hoped that some of them will 
be re-elected into the Merged Court to ensure a smooth 
transition. 
52. Ibid at art 2. 
53. Ibid at art 4. 
54. Beyani, supra note 41 at 585. 
( ) 
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There is also a transitional provision relating to the 
Registrar of the Human Rights Court, who shall remain in 
office until the appointment of a Registrar for the Merged 
Court. 55 The Merger Protocol also provides for the provisional 
validity of the 1998 Protocol, which shall remain in force for a 
transitional period not exceeding one (1) year or any other 
period determined by the Assembly, after entry into force of 
the Merger Protocol. This period is to enable the Human 
. Rights Court to take the necessary measures for the transfer of 
its prerogatives, assets, rights and obligations to the Merged 
Court. 56 Meanwhile, the States Parties have settled in advance 
the seat of the Merged Court, which "shall be same as the Seat 
of the African Court on Human and Peoples ' Rights". 57 The 
African Human Rights Court is presently seated in Arusha, 58 in 
a temporary building donated by the Government of Tanzania. 
The Merger Protocol provides that pending cases before the 
African Human Rights Court that are not concluded before the 
en~ry into force of the new Protocol "shall be transferred to the 
Human Rights Section" of the Merged Court. 59 What does the 
phrase "shall be transferred" mean? Will such cases begin de 
novo before the new judges - as is often the case in, say, most 
common law jurisdictions - or will the case simply continue 
from where it stopped? What happens where a transferred case 
is against a country that made the Article 34(6) Declaration 
under the 1998 Protocol accepting the jurisdiction of the 
· 55. Merger Prorocol, supra note 44 at art 6. 
56. Ibid at art 7. 
57. Merger Sratute, supra note 44atart 25(1). 
58. Arusha, Tanzania, is viewed as The Hague of Africa, because it presently 
hosts three international judicial bodies: the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR), the African Human Rights Court, and the Court of 
Justice of the East African Conununity (EAC) . 
59. Merger Protocol, supra note 44 at art 5. 
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Human Rights Court to receive cases directly from individuals 
and NGOs, but that country has not made a similar declaration 
under the Merger Statute? The answer probably lies in the 
Merger Protocol's further qualification, to wit, "on the 
understanding that such cases shall be dealt with in accordance 
with" the 1998 Protocol. 60 
Composition and Independence 
The manner in which the Merged Court is constituted will 
determine its effectiveness. The independence of the Court, for 
exa~ple, will be a sine qua non to effective redress, y.rhether 
on human rights and other types of legal rights. 'This segment, 
therefore, closely examines the provisions of the Merger 
Statute on the composition and independence of the Court, in 
comparative perspective. 
I. Composition 
The Court consists of a General Affairs Section and a Human 
Rights Section, each section constituted by eight Judges. 61 The 
sixteen judges of the "Full Court" will be elected by the AU 
Executive Council and appointed by the AU Assembly, 62 a 
rather odd provision since the AU Assembly usually 'elect' the 
principal officers of the AU organs, including, judges of the 
current Human Rights Court.63 It is even not clear what 
constitutes 'appointment' as distinct from 'election;' and the 
'Definitions' clause provides no guidance. Nonetheless, the 
judges "shall be elected through secret ballot by a two-thirds 
majority of Member States with voting rights. "64 In electing 
60. Ibid. 
61. Merger Statute, supra note 44 at art 16. 
62. Ibid at art 7(1). 
63. Human Rights Protocol, supra note 23 at art 14(1); ACJ Protocol, supra 
note 24 at art (( 1 )(h). 
64. Merger Statute, supra note 44 at art 7(2). 
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the judges, the Assembly must ensure, first, "equitable 
representation of the regions and the principal legal traditions 
of the Continent"65 and , second, "equitable gender 
representation. "66 
The provision on regional representation was one of the 
hotly debated issues during the Protocol's drafting process. 
States from North Africa argued in favour of strict numerical 
equality, advocating a 3-3-3-3-3 representation per region. 
Most other states preferred a 4-3-3-3-3 equation, with the West 
(with 16 members) and North (with five members) represented 
according to the weight of their AU membership. 67 The current 
composition of the ~uman Rights Court roughly follows the 4-
3-3-3-3 "equitable representation." The provision on gender 
representation is a positive response to the increasing advocacy 
for mainstreaming of women in national , sub-regional, and 
regional bodies. The provision is also in line with demands of 
the Women's Protoc~~. 68 
The judges mus~:be nationals of State Parties ,69 "elected 
from among person~·" of high moral character, who possess the 
qualifications requited in their respective countries for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are juris-consults 
of recog~zed competence and experience in international law 
65. lbid at art 7(4). 
66. lbid at art 7(5). 
67. Viljoe11, supra note 34 at 459 n 231. 
68. See Women Protocol, supra note 13at art 8(e) (urging states· "take all 
appropriate measures to ensure ... that women are represented equally in the 
judiciary and law enforcement organs" ibid para 8);AU Act, Constitutive 
Act of the African Union, adopted Jul 11, 2010, entry into force May 26, 
200l[AU Act) at art 4(1) (promoting "gender equality"); Solemn Declaration 
on Gender Equality in Africa, AU Doc Assembly/AU/Decl.12 (III) (July 
2003). 
69. Merger Statute, supra note 44atart 3(1). 
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and/or, human rights law. "70 By this provision, all judges of 
the Court need not be human rights experts (though they must 
be international law experts), but it is vital that the judges that 
will be appointed to the Human Rights Section of the Court 
should have "recognized competence and experience" in 
international human rights law and/or practice. 
All judges of the Merged Court shall, except the President 
and Vice-Present, perform their functions on part-time basis. 71 
In making the Court part-time, States Parties failed to give 
serious thoughts to the diverse legal (including human rights) 
issues that should commend. themselves for judicial 
determination in Africa, all things being equal. Judges of most 
contemporary international judicial institutions - for example, 
the JCJ, International Crin1inal Court (ICC), European Court 
of Justice and European Court of Human Rights - are 
constituted on a full-time basis; only the Inter-American Court 
on Huriian Rights pperates on a part-time basis. Having opted 
for a single regional court, the AU Assembly should have 
allowed the Court to operate full-time so as to fully discharge 
its mandate. Thus is also an issue of diplomacy. A part-time 
judicial .institution does not project the AU glowingly before 
other continental bodies. 
The Merger Statute provides that each Section of the Full 
Court "may, at any time, constitute one or several chambers.72 
A sectional or chambers' judgment is taken as that of the 
Court;73 indeed, the Protocol defines 'Court' to mean "the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights as well as its 
sections and chambers. "74 The chamber system is not really 
70. Ibid atart 4. 
71. Ibid at art 8(4). 
72. Ibid at art 19(1). The quorum required to constitute such chambers shall be 
determined in the Rules of Court. 
73. Ibid at art 9(2). 
74. Ibid at art 1 (emphasis supplied). 
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new. The ICJ has something similar; its Statute allows the 
Court to occasionally form one or more chambers composed of 
three or more judges as the Court may determine. 75 Such 
chambers are authorized to deal with particular classes of 
cases, for example, laces and cases relating to transit and 
communications. 
The judges shall hold their offices for six years, but they 
may be re-elected once.76 The Protocol provides for scattered 
election, to ensure continuity of pending cases. Consequently, 
"the term of office. of eight (8) judges, four (4) from each 
section, elected during the first election shall end after four (4) 
years. "77 The tenure of judges whose terms will expire after 
the initial four-year period shall be determined, for each 
section of the Court, "by lot drawn by the Chairperson of the 
Assembly or the Executive Council, immediately after the first 
election. "78 
2. Independence 
The Merger Statute seeks to secure the independence of the 
Court in many ways. It provides, more generally, that the 
independence of the judges shall be fully ensured in 
accordance with international law. 79 It expects the Court to act 
impartially, fairly and justly80 and that the Court and its judges 
shall not be subject lo the direction or control of any person or 
body in the discharge of their judicial functions. 81 The 
75. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, [ICJ St<1.tutc), at 
art 26. 
76. Merger Statute, supra note 44at art 8(1). 
77. Ibid. 
78. Ibid at art 8(2). 
79. Ibid at art 12(1). 
80. Ibid at art 12(2). 
81. Ibid at art 12(3). 
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"Solemn Declaration" includes a clause . that a judge of the 
Cou.rt shall 'faithfully,' 'impartially,' .and 'conscientiously' 
exercise the duties of his office, "without fear or favour, 
.. 
affection or ill will and that (he] will preserve the integrity of 
the Court. "82 · · :; : . _''.:.: 
The Statute provides, more specifical~y, that a judge shall : 
not be suspended or removed from offic(;'. except where, on the 
reconunendation of two-thirds majority of his/her colleagues, 
he/she no longer meets the requisite condi'tions to be a judge. 83 
Should such a situation occur, then the President shall 
communica.te the recommendation for the suspension or 
removal of the Judge to the Chairperson. of the AU Assembly 
through the Chairperson of the AU Commission; ·and "[s]uch a 
recommendation of the Court shall become final upon its 
adoption by the Assembly. "84Under the Human Rights 
Protocol, "the decision of the Court shall· be final unless it is 
set aside by the Assembly at its next session. "85 It is arguable 
which of the two provisions better secure the independence of 
the Court. 
The judges of the Court "shall enjoy, from the time of their 
election and throughout their term of office, the full privileges 
and immunities extended to diplomatic agents in accordance 
with international law; "86 and at no time. shall they be liable 
"for any act or omission committed in the discharge of their 
judicial functions. "87 The Statute also lays down the conditions 
for excluding a judge from participation in the settlement of a 
82. Ibid at art 11(1). 
83. Ibid at art 9(2). 
84. Ibid at arts 9(3) and (4). 
85. Human Rights Protocol, supra note 23 at art 19(2). 
86. Merger Statute, supra note 44 at art 15(1); !CJ Statllte, supra note 75 at art 
19. ("The members of the Court, when engaged on the business of the 
Court, shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities"). 
87. Merger Statute, supra note 44 atart 15(2). 
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case, 88 all aimed at preventing the charge of bias or its 
likelihood. Similarly, a Judge is not expected to engage in 
other activities that are incompatible with his judicial function 
or that might infringe on his independence or impartiality. 89 
These important expressions of international law are aimed at 
ensuring the full independence of the Court and its judges. 
While these measures are necessary, they are not sufficient to 
ensure institutional independence in the absence of other 
measures, such as sufficient funding. 
Jurisdiction 
Three categories of jurisdiction are provided for under the 
Merger Protocol and Statute: subject-matter, personal, and 
advisory. 
I. Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae 
Both the jurisdictions of the Human Rights Court and ACJ 
under their respective protocols are incorporated in defining 
the jurisdiction rationemateriae of the Merged Court. The 
. matters covered have already been highlighted in part three. In 
general, they include all cases and all legal disputes submitted 
to it relating, inter alia, to the interpretation and application of 
the AU Act; interpretation, application or validity of other 
treaties and subsidiary legal instnnnents adopted within the 
framework of the AU/OAU; and the interpretation and the 
application of the African Charter, the African Child Charter, 
the Women Protocol, or any other legal instrument relating to 
human rights and ratified by the State concerned. 90 
88. Ibid at art 14. 
89. Ibid at art 13(1). 
90. Ibid atart 28. 
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The new Court obviously has an expansive jurisdiction 
compared to any previous institutional experiment in Africa. It 
will interpret not only legal instruments adopted under the 
auspices of the OAU/ AU but also those adopted outside the 
Continent but ratified by the State before it. The African Child 
Charter is also specifically included among treaties within the 
Court's ambit. Until now, tbe Charter had no implementing 
judicial institution, other than the African Committee with 
mandate limited 1argely to investigating children's . rights 
violations and issuing reports and recommendations. With this 
inclusion, the African Child Charter stands on the same 
footing with the African Charter and Women Protocol which, 
hitherto, were subject to interpretation and application by the 
Human Rights Court. 
The Statute carefully compartmentalizes the Court's 
jurisdiction. The General Affairs Section is competent to hear 
all cases submitted under Article 28 of the Statute "save those 
concerning human and/or peoples' rights issues, "91 while the 
Human Rights Section shall be competent to hear all cases 
relating to human and/or peoples rights. 92 The Statute spells 
out the procedure to be followed in contentious cases, which 
depends on the subject-matter. Cases brought before the 
General ·Affairs Section shall be submitted by written 
application addressed to the Registrar, indicating the subject of 
the dispute, the applicable law, and basis of jurisdiction. 93 
However, cases brought before the Human Rights Section shall 
be submitted by a written application to the Registrar, 
indicating the rights alleged to have been violated, and, insofar 
as it is possible, the provisions of the relevant human rights 
91. Ibid at art 17 (italics in the original). 
92. Ibid. 
93. Ibid at art 33(1). 
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instrument on which it is based. 94 In all cases, the Registrar is 
mandated to immediately give notice of the application to all 
parties concerned and to the relevant AU organs. 
The Court will draw up its "Rules of Court," "taking into 
account the complementarity between the Court and other 
treaty bodies of the Union. "95 It is imperative that the Rules 
should be simple and capable of fostering speed without 
sacrificing quality. Surprisingly, the Statute fails to provide for 
amicable settlement of disputes in a Continent that prides itself 
as ~aving a uniquely conciliatory traditional justice ~ystem. It 
is not clear if this omission was deliberate, considering that 
'amicable settlement' features prominently in previous regional 
and sub-regional instruments, including the African Economic 
Conununity (AEC) Treaty, 96 the African Charter, 97 the Human 
Rights Protocol,98 and the Treaty Establishing the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). 99 The SADC 
Treaty, for example, provides that disputes arising from the 
interpretation and applicable of the SADC Treaty should be 
settled in a friendly manner. Only if amicable attempt fails 
should the dispute be referred to the SADC Tribunal. 100 
94. Ibid at art 34(1). 
95. Ibid at art 38. 
96. African Economic Community Treaty, adopted June 3, 1991, entry into 
force May 11, 1994, 30ILM1241, Art 87(1) [AEC Treaty]. 
97. African Charter, supra note 13 at paras 47 and 48. 
98. Human Rights Protocol, supra note 23 at para 9 (providing: "The Court 
may try to reach an amicable settlement in a case pending before it in 
accordance with the provisions of the Charter"). 
99. Treaty Establishing the Southern African Development Community, adopted 
Aug 17, 1992 (1993) 32 ILM 116 [SADC Treaty). 
100. Ibid at para 32. 
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2. Jurisdiction Ratione Personae 
A major criticism of the Human Rights Protocol has been that 
individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) do 
not have an automatic standing before the Human Rights 
Court. Regrettably, this provision was smuggled into the final 
Draft Protocol, despite strong opposition by segments of 
Africa's civil society. The only entities that will have 
automatic standing before the new Court in respect of human 
rights matters are State Parties to the Protocol; the African 
Commission; the African Committee; African 
Intergovernmental Organizations · .accr~dited to the AU or its 
orga~s; and African National Human Rights Institutions. IOI 
Individuals or NGOs will be entitled to submit human rights 
cases against a State Party only where such a State has made a 
declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive 
cases involving the State in question. I02 
The Draft Protocol proposed that a wording similar to 
Article 34(6) of the Human Rights Protocol be omitted and that 
a general clause should be inserted allowing states explicitly to 
enter reservations that are compatible with the Protocol's 
object and purpose. I03 Accepting this proposal would have 
meant that "states accept direct access of the Court, unless 
they 'opt out' by entering a reservation to that effect. "104 
However, the adopted Protocol requires that states 'opt in' to 
accept direct individual or NGO access to the Court with 
respect to human rights matters. Th~ requirement effectively . 
shuts the door against many individuals and NGOs, the very 
entities that drive human rights. As Odinkalu and Mbelle 
argue, "African leaders know their states will not sue one 
101. Merger Statute, supra note 44 at para 30. 
102. Ibid at para 30(f); Merger Protocol, supra note 44 atpara 8(3). 
103. Viljoe11, supra note 34 at 459. 
104. Ibid. 
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another for human rights violations or for electi<?n-rigging. By 
denying individual victims access to the new court, 
governments will close an avenue through which atrocities 
might be addressed, effectively rendering the court still- \, 
born. "105 
This requirement of a state declaration is also superfluous, 
because the African Charter already provides a check against 
vexatious and frivolous petitions through the admissibility 
procedure~ 106 especially the requirement of exhaustion of local 
remedies. 107 The local remedies rule - the rule that "a State 
should be given the opportunity to redress an alleged wrong 
within the fram~work of its own domestic legal system before 
its international responsibility can be called into question at 
[the] international level" 108 - reinforces the subsidiary and 
complementary relationship of the international system to 
systems of internal protection. Imposing further, onerous, 
requirements in the Merger Protocol is like attempting to kill a , , 
snake with a sledgehammer. ~ 
105. Odinkalu & Mbelle: "Africa: Continent Needs Effective Human Rights 
Court" (2008), online: All Africa 
http://allafrica.com/stories/20080624071 a.html ?page= 2: 
106. African Charter, supra note 13 at art 56. C.f Human Rights Protocol, supra 
note 23 at art 6(2) ("The Court shall rule on the admissibility of cases 'takin'g 
into account the provisions of article 56 of the Charter"). ; 
107. African Charter, supra note 13 at art 56(5) (providing "Communications 
relating to human and peoples' rights referred to in 55 received by the 
Commission, shall be considered if they ... [a]re sent after exhausting local 
remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that this procedure is unduly. 
prolonged"). 
108. A.A. Cancado Trindade: The Application of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local 
Remedies in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press;-' 1983) 
I 
at 1; and generally Nsongurua Udombana, "So Far, So Fair:/ The Local 
Remedies Rule in the Jurisprudence of the African CommiJsion on Human 
and Peoples' Rights" (2003) 97(1) Am J lnt'/ L l. 
I 
I 
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The provision denying individuals and NGOs automatic 
standing is also at variance with current international legal 
norms and practice, which vests individuals with rights and 
responsibilities, a shift from the 'hobbesian' conception of 
sovereignty, which centred on the state, to a 'kantian' notion 
of sovereignty, which centres on universal citizenship. In his 
address at the closing ceremony of the seminar on "The Inter-
American System of protection of Human Rights on the Eve of 
the XXIst Century", held on November 24, 1999, in San Jose, 
Costa Rica, Judge Antonio Augusto Can9ado Trindade-
former President of the Inter-American Court-stated: 
( \ The widest participation of the petitioners in all stages of 
I 
the procedure before the Court (locus standi) is to be secured, 
as part of the process conducive to the crystallization of the 
right of direct access to the Court (jus standi) by the 
iµdividu.als as subjects of the International Law of Human 
Rights, endowed with full procedural capacity. 109 
Almost all of the major human rights ... treaties give 
individuals automatic access before their judicial mechanisms, 
including the European Convention, which provides: "The 
Court may receive applications from any person, non-
governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to 
be the victim of a violation . . . The High Contracting Parties 
undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of 
this right". 110 Even sub-regional economic treaties give 
individuals direct access before their courts, like the Protocol · ·. 
. .. ., 
109. Quoted in Information· Note on the First Meeting of African Court on 
Human and Peoples' Rights, available at http:l/www.africa-
u11ion.orglroot/AU/Confere11ces/Past/2006/July/summitldoc/CADHPIBACK 
GROUND DOCUMENT ON THE AFRICAN COURT.doc. 
- - -
110. Convention· for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
adopted Nov 4, 1950, entry into force Sept 9, 1953, ETS 5; 213 UNTS 221 
at art 34. 
Eyi11g tile Promised Land: Tile Wearisome Quest for an 207 
Effective Regional Human Rigllts Enforcement Mechanism in Africa 
on the ECOWAS Court of Justice. 11t Why are African States 
fearful of their own continental judicial institution? A 
government that truly governs in the best interest of its people 
should have no fears of an independentjudiciary.112 
3. Advisory Jurisdiction 
Besides contentious matters, the Court may give advisory 
opinion "on any legal question" at the request of the principal 
organs of the AU .113 Unlike contentious matters, the Statute 
does not indicate which section of the Court should handle 
what type of ' legal question,' but there is a proviso that "A 
request for an advisory opinion must not be related to a 
pending application before the African Commission or the 
African Conunittee of Experts. "114 The Statute sets the 
procedure for advisory opinion: a written request must be laid 
before the Court, containing "an exact statement of the 
question upon . which the opinion is required and shall be 
accompanied by all relevant documents." 115 The Registrar shall 
forthwith give notice of the request to all States or organs 
entitled to ;;tppear before the Court. 116 Written and/or oral 
statements are then sought and received from interesting 
parties, whereupon the Court "shall deliver .. its advisory 
111. Supplementary Protocol to the Protocol on the ·ECOW AS Community Court 
of Justice 2005, Art 10 [ECOWAS Court Supplementary Protocol]; Henry 
Onoria, "Locus Standi of. Individuals and Non-State Entities before Regional 
Economic Integration Judicial Bodies in Africa" (2010) 18 Afr J lnt'l & 
Comp L 143 (appraising the role that locus standt of individuals and non-
State crttities has on economic integration processes in Africa) . 
112. Media Rights Agendll & Others v. Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 
1998) para 81 [African Commission]. 
113. Merger Statute, supra note 44 ·~tart 53(1). 
114. Ibid at art 53(3). 
115. Ibid at art 53(2). 
116. Ibid at art 54(1). 
208 The Transnational Human Rights Review __ 
op1mon in open court, notice having been given to the 
Chairperson of the Commissiop and Member States, and other 
· International Organizations directly concerned. "117 
Like the name implies, advisory opinions are not binding, 
but . they often provide guidance to the advisee and to Member 
States. desiring to inttoduce necessary domestic reforms or to 
oppose legislation that would be in breach of existing law. 
Governments usually "find it easier to give effect to advisory 
opinion than to comply with a contentious decision in a case 
they lost. "118 Advisory opinions also provide guidance to 
domestic courts grappling with interpre~tion and application 
of especially international law related issues. · 
Remedial Authority 
International (human rights) law recognizes a right to a 
remedy. 119 One of the features that distinguish a judicial from a 
117. /bidatart55. 
118. Thomas Buergenthal: "The European and Inter-American Human Rights 
Courts: Beneficial Interraction" in Paul Mahoney etal eds, Protecting 
Human Rights: The European Pen.pectives (Koeln: Carl Heymannns Verlag 
KG, 2000) 123 at 131. 
119. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, GA Res 217A (III), UN Doc 
A/810 at 71 (1948), Art 8 [UDHR] (providing that "[e]veryone has the right 
to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating 
the .fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or law"); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 99 UNTS 171 (Dec 16, 
1966) [ICCPR], Arts 2(3), 9(5) & 14(6) (containing three separate articles 
addressing the right of access to an authority competent to afford remt:dies -
including the right to an effective and enforceable remedy - and the right of 
anyone unlawfully arrested, detained, or convicted to have an enforceable 
right to compensation);Commission on Human Rights, UN Basic Principles 
and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, Res 2005/35 (Apr 2005) (containing both 
procedural and substantive dimensions to the right to reparations). The Basic 
Principles and Guidelines do not create anY. new substantive international or 
domestic legal obligations; they merely identify mechanisms, modalities, 
procedures, and methods of implementing existing legal obligations. 
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quasi-judicial body is their remedial powers. One weakness of 
the African Commission has been its lack of judicial teeth to 
bite where it finds clear cases of human rights violations. The 
Merged Court is not so constituted; a contrario , its Statute 
expressly grants it powers to offer structural remedies. It 
provides that "the Court may, if it considers that there was a 
violation of a human or peoples' right, order any appropriate . 
measures in order to remedy the situation, including granting 
fair compensation. "12° Compensation is a form of reparation; 
and the goal of reparation is. to promote justice by redressing 
injury suffered. There are basically two elements involved in 
reparation claims: the scope of the injury and magnitude of the 
misconduct. 121 It is hoped that the Merged Court, particularly 
its Human Rights Section, will bear this in mind when 
ordering compensations under the Statute. 
The Court may also, on its own motion or the parties' 
application, indicate provisional measures if it considers that 
circumstances require preserving the res. 122 Provisional or 
interim measures are particularly useful in the regime of 
human rights protection because_, most often, their complaint 
procedures are long-drawn. A party may incur irreparable 
damage, physically or to property rights, during such time-
consuming administrative and judicial procedures. Sometimes, 
the authority to issue such measures are expressly provided for 
in treaties establishing each tribunal (as in this case) or through 
the back door of procedural rules. 123 Including provisional 
120. Merger Statute, supra note 44 at art 45. 
121. Dinah Shelton: Remedies in JntemaJional Human Rights Law (Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 2006) (providing an overview of the law and practice 
governing human rights remedies) . 
122. Merger Statute, supra note 44 at art 35(1). 
123. Nsongurua Udombana, "Interim Measures: A Comparative Study of 
Selected International Judicial Institutions" (2003)43(3) Indian J Int 'l L 479. 
210 The Tra11s11atio11al ll11111an Rights Review 
measures in a treaty should create a stronger legal obligation 
on States Parties than if such power was subsequently defined 
in Rules of Procedure. 
Relationship with Other Regional Mechanisms 
The African Court Protocol situates its Court within the 
circumference of ex1stmg, especially human rights, 
institutions. The Court is adopted to "supplement the mandate 
and efforts of other continental treaty bodies as well as national 
institutions in protecting human rights. "124 The Protocol 
specifically referep.ces the African Commission and the 
African Committee, which is empowered to receive individual 
and inter-state communications and is mandated to examine 
state reports125 and to undertake fact-finding missions. 126 There 
are other treaty bodies within the AU organs that have 
bearings on human rights. Among these are the AU Assembly, 
Executive Council, Permanent Representative Council, PAP, 
AU Commission, and PSC. As the 'Supreme Organ', the AU 
Assembly performs the law-making function of setting human 
rights and other standards and elaborating soft laws 
(declarations, resolutions, decisions, etcetera), as well as the 
executive function of monitoring implementation of policies 
and decisions and ensuring compliance by Member States. 127 
Other quasi-judicial bodies with specific human rights 
mandate - besides the African Committee - include the 
African Commission, the African Coordinating Committee of 
National Human Rights Institutions, and African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM), a voluntary self-monitoring mechanism 
cr~ated under the NEP AD to promote good governance in 
124. Merger Protocol, supra note 44 at preamble. 
125. African Child Charter, supra note 13 arts 43 and 44. 
126. Ibid at para 45(1). This mandate mirrors that of the African Commission, as 
authorized by Art 46 of the African Cllarter, supra note 13 
127. AU Act, supra note 68 at art 9. 
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Africa. The Merger Protocol provides that the attainment of 
the objectives in the principal regional human rights treaties 
requires the establishment of a judicial organ to supplement 
and strengthen the mission of these quasi-judicial implementing 
bodies. 128 Certainly, the proliferation of these mechanisms, 
some with their own human rights mandate, makes 
coordination an imperative. The greatest challenge will be how 
to construct a united response to human rights from this 
plethora of institutions. In 2006, .the Executive Council of the 
AU stressed "the need for closer collaboration between various 
. . 
policy organs with competence in human rights as well as with 
national human rights bodies" .129 The future Court could play 
a significant role in accomplishing that collaboration. 
An Endless Wilderness Journey? 
October 2011 marked the thirtieth anniversary of the. adoption 
of the African Charter. The year 2011 also marks the tenth 
a1miversary of the entry into force of the AU Act, in which 
Member States promised, inter alia, "to take all necessary 
measures to· strengthen our common institutions and provide 
them with the necessary powers and resources to enable them 
discharge their respective mandates effectively". 130 Given that 
most of the organs envisaged under the AU Act have been 
established, it is legitj.mate to ask why the constitution of a 
judicial organ is being unreasonably delayed. 131 Is this delay 
128. Merger Protocol, supra note 44 at preamble. 
129. AU Doc Ex.CUDec.306 (IX) (June 2006). 
130. AU Act, su11ra note 68 at preamble; Merger Protocol, supra note 44 at 
preamble. 
131. The following are the Principal Organs of the AU: Assembly of the Union, 
Executive Council, Pan-African Parliament, Court of Justice, Commission, 
Permanent Representatives Committee, Specialised Technical Committee, 
Economic, Social and Cultural Council, Peace and Security Council, and 
Financial Institutions. AU Act, supra note 68at art 5. · 
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caused by lack of will or means (or both)? Already, efforts are 
on to further amend the Merger Protocol to fit the yet-to-be-
established Court with criminal jurisdiction over international 
crimes "committed on African soil". 132 When will this 
Wilderness Journey end? Is it even a journey with a goal and 
an object, like Jason going to find the Golden Fleece? 
· This final Part reflects on Africa's journey to realise human 
rights, democracy' rule of law and sustainable development as 
well as the road not yet taken. 
Acknowledging Some Milestones . 
As previously indicated, Africa has witnessed the proliferation 
of various supranational institutions in the last decade, some 
h~ving bearings on human rights. There are also sub-regional 
judicial courts that interpret and enforce human rights 
instruments in addition to treaty laws bn integration. The 
foremost sub-regional judicial institutions include the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
Court of Justice, the East African Commu11ity (BAC);Court of 
Justice, and the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) Tribunal. In principle, each of these courts is 
expected to contribute towards strengthening the rule of law, 
developing international economic law and protecting human 
rights. 
132. Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly Decision on the 
· International Criminal Court Doc.EX.CL/670(XIX), AU Doc 
Assembly/ AU/Dec.366(XVII) (July 201 1), para 8 (Decision on ICC] (asking 
"the [AU] Commission in collaboration with the Permanent Representatives' 
·committee to reflect on how best Africa's interests can be fully defended 
and protected in the international judicial system, aµd to actively pursue the 
implementation of the Assembly's Decisions on the African Court of Justice 
and Human and Peoples' ·Rights being empowered to try serious 
international crimes committed on African soil "). See Nsongurua 
Udombana: "The ICC, African Unioh, and Politics of International Criminal 
Justice" (forthcoming, on file with author). 
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In about a decade of its existence, the AU has built an 
impressive architecture for the protection of human rights and 
peoples' rights and for the promotion of rule of law, 
democracy and good governance, and sustainable development 
in Africa. It has also adopted more than a dozen treaties and 
unveiled more than a dozen institutions touching on policy-
formulation, decision-making, implementation, enforcement 
and/or support for democracy, good governance, rule of law, 
human rights, peace and security. 133 The AU has called on its 
Member States to adopt policie~ and mechanism that wµl 
create safe, decent and competitive employment 
opportunities, 134 in recognition of the endemic unemployment 
situation in Africa. One positive outcome from these 
developments is that citizens are increasingly informed of 
human rights issues. On occasions, governments have been 
compelled to explain on how their policies and practices 
implicate on humai-1 and peoples' rights, whether in relation to 
land distribution in Zimbabwe or environmental despoliation in 
Nigeria's Niger Delta. 
However, many problems remain, as the next segment 
examines. 
The Road Not Yet Taken 
The decision to integrate the ACJ with the Human Rights 
Court could be a. blessing in disguise. The Court, when 
established, could become a sort of 'High Court' taking on 
133. Report of the Study on the Implications of Expanding the Mandate of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights to try Serious Crimes of 
International Concern, AU Doc Legal/ACJHR-PAP/5(II) (Nov 2010), at 
para 2 [Report of Study]. 
134. Decision on the Theme: "Accelerating Youth Empowerment for Sustainable 
Development Doc. Assembly I AU /2(XVII) " , AU Doc 
Assembly/AU/Dec.363(XVII) (July 2011), at para 5(1 ) . 
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broader issues of significance to all of Africa. Potentially, it 
could also serve as an apex court for the various sub-regional 
courts currently in existence. 135 However, this optimism 1s 
tempered with scepticism for a number of reasons. 
1. Same Old Challenges 
Notwithstanding the wonderful initiatives to promote rule of 
law, democracy and good governance, and sustainable 
development in Africa, several challenges remain. There is 
still the challenge of gross human rights abuses and- impunity 
by the very leaders_ who have pledged to protect lives and 
properties. Africans still groan under yokes of abusive 
governments that 'threaten the hmocent and spare the 
guilty' 136- from Zimbabwe to Libya, Uganda to Ethiopia, 
Gambia to Rwanda, Liberia to Swaziland, and Algeria to 
Egypt, to mention a few bastions of crudity of power. The 
African Commission still receive reports of unabated human 
rights violations, "including extrajudicial killings, torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment; restriction 
on freedom of expression and the press, association, assembly, 
arbitrary detention and arrests of journalists, human rights 
defenders and political opponents". 137 
Corruption compounds the problem, as ruthless rulers 
entrench and enrich themselves at the price of their peoples' 
dignity. There is the challenge of peace and security, as sounds 
of AK47 still reverberate in half a dozen African countries -
135. Olufemi Elias: "Introductory Note to the Protocol on the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights" (2009) 48 ILM 334 at 335 
[Elias, "lntrod11cto1)' Note"] (noting the significance of creating "a pan-
African court of general competence"). 
136. In Latin, minaturinnocentibus qui parcitnocentibus. 
137. African Commission on Human and People's Rights, Activity Report 2008 
EX.CL/446(XIII), at para 12 (referring to the human rights situation in 
Africa as "bleak and a cause for concern"). 
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including the Democratic Republic (DR) of Congo, Somalia, 
and Sudan. The AU Assembly observed as much during its 
recent Summit in Equatorial Guinea: "Africa continues to face 
serious challenges in the area of peace and security, despite the 
significant progress made in conflict resolution and peace 
building." 138 Concomitant with conflicts is the challenge of 
political instability, as coups and attempted coups still threaten 
constitutional democracy and governance in Africa. Several 
coups have occurred in Africa since the AU Act, which 
prohibits unconstitutional changes of goverrunents, 139 entered 
into force. 140 · 
In each case, the AU was unwilling to recognize the 
government that came to power through coup, as enjoined by 
the AU Act, 141 but some of the regimes had popular and 
political support within the state. 142 It would appear that some 
of the political crises and conflicts in Africa are triggered by 
years of brutal dictatorships and by the current deep global 
economic recession. 
138. Decision on the Report of the Peace and Security Council on Its Activities 
and the State of Peace and Security in Africa Doc. Assembly/AU/4(XVTI), 
AU Doc Assembly/AU/Dcc.369(XVII) (July 2011), para 3. 
139. See AV Act, supra note 68 at art 4(p) (condenming and rejecting 
"unconstitutional changes of governments"). 
140. These include Togo (2005), Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Guinea (2008), 
Madagascar (2009), and Niger (2010). 
141. !bid at para 30 ("Governments which shall come to power through 
unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of 
the Union"). The AU has developed a policy of strongly opposing 
unconstitutional regime change. Sec Thomas Bassett & Scott Straus, 
"Defending Democracy in Cote d'Ivoire Africa Takes a Stand" (2011) 90 
Foreign A.ff at 130 (commending the diplomatic actions by the AU and 
ECOWAS during the constitutional crisis in Cote d'Ivoire). 
142. Bki Omorogbe: "A Club of Incumbents? The African Union and Coups 
d'Etat" (2011)44 Vand J. Tra11s11at'l L 123 (calling on the AU to pursue a 
more nuanced policy on the problem of coups in Africa). 
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There is the challenge of how to positively create an 
environment for sustainable economic growth and guarantee to 
all persons a life of dignity, prosperity, and happiness. 
Terrorism, militancy, and religious extremism continue to 
strike fear on the population of many countries. In some of 
Nigeria's major cities, ·the Boko Harmn143 sect is terrorising 
persons and agencies, making some officials and experts worry 
that a branch of al-Qaeda has spread its influence to that 
country. 144 
2. Lack of Political Will to Implement and Enforce Decisions 
A related challenge is th~ lack of politica~ commitment of 
states to implement and enforce its decisions. For example, 
only three countries - Burkina Faso, Libya, and Mali - have 
so far ratified the Merger Protocol. 145 The ratification is an 
average of one a year; at this speed, it probably will take 
fifteen years to secure the needed fifteen ratifications before 
the operationalization of the Court. It is not clear why the 
Merger Protocol did not provide for implied ratification in 
respect of states that have already ratified the two earlier 
Protocols. The Draft Protocol provided that, for such states, 
the signing of the Protocol "shall constitute consent to be 
143. Meaning, "Western Education is evil". 
144. Karen Leigh: "Nigeria's Boko Haram: Al-Qaeda's New Friend in Africa?" 
Time World, Aug 31, 2011, available al 
http://www. time. co111/ti111e/worldlarticle/O, 8599, 2091137, 00.html ("Until 
recently, the group Doko Haram has conducted attacks on Nigerian 
government targets in what most terrorism experts considered an indigenous 
campaign to further the organization's aim of installing Islamic law in West 
Africa's most volatile country. Friday's attack [on U.N. building in Abuja) 
· now has officials and experts worrying that a branch of al-Qaeda has spread 
its influence to Nigeria"). 
145. List of Countries which have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol on 
the Statute of the African Court of Justice And Human Rights, as al Jan 27, 
2011, online: African Union 
< http://www.au. i111/e11/sites/default/files/9999Protocol _ o11 _ Stawte _ of_tlte _A 
frican_ Court _of_Justice _ and_HR.pdf>. 
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bound", 146unless an intention to the contrary is expressed. This 
vital provision was intended to ensure a timely entry into force 
of the Merger Protocol, but it was regrettably omitted in the 
final document. 
This half-hearted attitude is also shown in the number of 
states that have so far ratified the Human Rights Protocol - 26 
states, 147 just about half of the present 53 Member States of the 
AU. Of this number, only Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mali, 
Tanzania, and Ghana, have made the Article 34(6) Declaration 
accepting the jurisdiction of the Court to receive cases directly 
from individuals and NGOs. 148 · The delay in ratifying the 
Protocol "is an impediment and does not enable the Court to 
discharge its duties smoothly and attain its goals as the judicial 
body responsible for the protection and enhancement of human 
rights" .149 Similarly, the failure of many of the ratifying states 
to make the Article 34(6) Declaration "may have a negative 
impact on access by African States and citizens to the 
Court" .150 Indeed, as long as a good number of Member States 
do not ratify the Protocol relating to the establishment of the 
Court, or ~o not make the declaration to accept the jurisdiction 
of the Court to directly receive cases instituted individuals and 
non-governmental organizations, access to the Court will 
146. Draft Protocol, supra note 41 at art 8(2). 
147. AU List of Countries Which IIave Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the, Protocol 
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment 
of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, online: African Union 
< llllp :I lwww. au. i11tle11/sites/defa11lt ljiles/992acl1pr.pdf > 
148. Ibid. Tanzania's Article 34(6) Declaration provides that, "such entitlement is 
only to be granted to such NGOs and Individuals once all domestic legal 
remedies have been exhausted and in adherence to the Constitution of the 
United Republic of Tanzania" ibid. This qualification is superfluous, since 
the exhaustion of local remedies is already an admissibility requirement 
under the African regional human rights system. 
149. Activity Report 2010, at para 9. 
150. Ibid atpara 10. 
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remain extremely limited and the legal system for the 
protection of human and peoples' rights through the Court 
would not play its role on the continent fully. 151 
Five years after its establishment, the Arusha Human 
Rights Court is yet to conclude a single matter on its merit, 
except for a few admissibility and interlocutory decisions. At 
least one judge, who was appointed to the Court for a-six-year 
tenure, resigned his appointment few years thereafter, 
probably due to frustration. 152 Some judges who were elected 
for an initial tenure of two or even four years - based on a 
staggered arrangement153 - completed their tenure without 
hearing a single case on its merit. On the face of it, the 
resources used in capacitating those expired Judges, including 
their honoraria, have been in vain. Meanwhile, the Court's 
approved budget for 2010 was USD 7,939,375, made up of 
USD 6,169,591 for operations, and USD 1,769,784 for 
programmes. 154 Does the end justify this means? 
3. Disobedience to Judicial Orders and Threats to Sub-
Regional Judicial Independence 
Enforcement of judicial remedies , whether domestic or 
international, is contingent on the political will of states. The 
recent contemptuous disobedience of the Court's order for 
151. Ibid atpara 26. 
152. Activity Report 2010, at para 3 ("Judge Githu Muigai (Kenya) who was 
elected in July 2008 for a six-year term of office informed the President of 
the Court by leuer of 3 June 2009 of his resignation"). 
153. Human Rights Protocol, supra ·note 23 at art 15(1) (providing: "The terms 
of four judges elected at the first election shall expire at the end of two 
years, and the· terms of four more judges shall expire at the end of four 
years"). 
154. Decision on the Budget of the African Union for the 2010 Financial Year2 
Assembly/AU/13(XIV), AU Doc Asscmbly/AU/Dec.287(XIV) (Jan. 2010), 
para 2 [Decision 011 Budget]. 
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provisional measures by the Government of Libya155 - State 
Party to the African Charter - shows that states are likely to 
'trample under feet' the decisions of a future unified court. In 
Africa, hope dissolves into anxiety when one reflects on states' 
attitude towards the African Commission. Except for limited 
exceptions, goverrunents' record in implementing decisions of 
the Commission is abysmal. At each yearly sunm1it of the 
OAU/AU Assembly, African leaders take note of the 
Commission's "Activity Report;" commends it for the work it 
accomplished and urges it to pursue and intensify efforts ~ this 
regard; reiterates the need for the Commission to be provided 
with adequate resources to remove donor dependence and 
enable it discharge its mandate effectively; and, finally, 
authorize the Commission to publish its Report. 156 African 
governments do everything to flatter the Commission except to 
respect its recommendations; and such non-compliance 
constitutes "one of the major factors of the erosion of the 
Commission's credibility" .157 
Many states are working hard to undermine the 
independence, sometimes the very existence, of the existing 
sub-regional courts that these states created. In July 2008, the 
ECOWAS Court ordered Gambia to release Chief 
EbrimaManneh, a journalist who was arrested in 2006, and to 
pay him USD 100,000. The Gambian Government not only 
ignored the ruling; it brought a proposal before ECOW AS 
155. Order for Provisional Measures, onJine:hup:/lwww.africa11-
cou/'f. orglenlimages/docw11e11ts/Orders-Files/ORDER _Application_ 002-
2013 _African_ Commission_v _libya.pdf (visited 14/04/2014). 
156. Decision on the Report of Activities of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples' Rights, AU Doc EX.CL/446(XIID (2008) .. 
157. African Commission, Non-Compliance of State Parties to Adopted 
Recommendations of the African Commission: A Legal Approach, OA U 
DOC/OS/50b (XXIV) (1998), para 2. 
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Assembly to amend Articles 9(4) and lO(d) of the 
Supplementary Protocol of the ECOW AS Court, 158 which 
grants direct access to the Court in cases involving violation of 
human rights, making the rule of exhaustion of domestic 
remedies not applicable before the Court. 159 
The SADC Tribunal has had a similar experience. In 
Campbell v Zimbabwe160 and a series of similar cases, 161 the 
Tribunal held Zimbabwe in breach of the SADC Treaty by 
compulsorily acquiring farms from white landowners without 
offering them proper compensation and denying them a 
judicial remedy. Zimbabwe refused to honour ~he judgements, 
which Mugabe referred to as 'nonsense' and 'of no 
consequence' . The government issued a statement to the effect 
that the state was not bound by the regional court's ruling, 
regarding it as being null and void of any legal effect. 162 The 
SADC Summit did not push Zimbabwe to comply with its 
treaty obligation. Instead, the SADC leaders set up a 
committee to review the Tribunal's mandate and prohibited the 
Tribunal from receiving new cases or holding hearings until 
August 2012, when the review process is expected to 
158. Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01105. 
159. Amnesty Int'l, Public Statement: "West Africa: Proposed Amendment to 
ECOWAS Court Jurisdiction is a Step Backward", AI Index: APR 
05/00512009, online: Amnesty International 
< II r tp: //www. amnesty. org I en llibra1y /asset I A FROS/00512009 I e11 lb83jDc07-
58d7-447b-9b 2e-8d90c 721 ad96/afr050052009e11. lltml >(calling on 
ECOWAS Member States "to reject the proposed amendment by The 
Gambia, and to ensure that the jurisdiction of the Court is not eroded in any 
way with regard to the adjudication of human rights cases from the sub-
region"). 
160. Campbell v. Zimbabwe, SADC (T) 212007. 
L6l. Gideon Stephanus Theron & Orflers v Zimbabwe, SADC (T) 0212008; 
SADC (T) 03/2008; SADC (T) 04/2008; SADC (T) 06/2008. 
162. "Zimbabwe not bound by regional court ruling: Justice Minister", online: 
Jurist < lltrp:l /jurisr. orglpaperchase/2010107 lzimbabwe-is-nor-bou11d-by-
sadc-ruli11gs-j11sticemi11ister.p/lp >. 
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complete. Hi3 In essence, the SADC Tribunal is being 
persecuted for performing its judicial functions based on the . 
evidence available before it. Gratuitous attacks of this nature 
raise questions whether Africa is ready for supranational 
courts. 164 The growing trend to intimidate judicial bodies dents 
the economic integration agenda in Africa; and it is sad that 
this is happening at a time when the AU and its Member States 
are calling for "African solutions to African problems". 
4. The Perennial Problem of lnsfi:tutional Underfunding 
The AU is proposing a unified court at a time of considerable 
institutional confusion and flux. Many new regional institutions 
have come on board in the last decade, some with conflicting 
mandate with earlier mechanisms. Many of these institutions 
are grossly underfunded by their parent bodies, resulting in 
their inability to effectively perform their statutory mandates. 
Many of these ~stitutions still carry bowels to beg for money 
from the European Union (EU), Canadian . International 
Development Agency (CIDA), German Technical Cooperation 
Agency (GTZ); Konrad Adenauer Foundation; Danish Institute 
of Human Rights; McArthur Foundation , Open Society Justice 
Initiative, and other Western institutions. 
163. Precious Ndlovu: "Campbell v Republic of Zimbabwe: A Moment of Truth 
for the SADC Tribunal" (2011) l SADC LJ 63 at 78 ("While the review of 
the Tribunal's structure and function is not in itself irregular, the same 
cannot be said of the effect that this decision has had on the work of the 
Tribunal. The Tribunal's power to receive and hear new matters has been 
withdrawn. The Summit failed to renew the terms of office of the judges 
whose tenure had expired .... Consequently, the Summit's decision in intent 
and effect suspended the Tribunal"). 
164. "ls Africa Ready for Supranational Courts?" Africa Legal Aid Newsletter 
(Sept 2011), online: Africa Legal Aid 
< htlp://www.africalegalaid.com/!Manager/Mailing Web/5300/XZmITRGBU 
a6k/385401/1457169#>. 
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The African Commission again provides a telling 
illustration of institutional neglect; and this is how Viljoen 
expresses the problem: 
Despite repeated calls by the [AU] Assembly, 
the Commission and its Secretariat remain 
under-resourced, and are forced to rely on 
outside funds for most of its promotional work 
and for the appointment of at least a bare 
minimum of legal officers. Despite making lofty 
declarations a~d commitments of support to the 
. . Commissi~n, especially on the occasion of the 
.w. • 20-year commemoration of the adoption of the 
.Charter, the AU allowed the Commission's 
.. staffing situation to deteriorate into an 
. · · .'. . ~nprecedented crisis. 165 
: • T ,lo 
t·'• 
... , ,Tne approved budget for the African Commission for the 
f:Q08 . ·.f~s.cal year was USD 6,003,856.86, comprising an 
9.P~rational Budget of USD 4,584,390.00, and a Programme 
Bu~get; of USD 1,419,466.86. 166 In 2010, that figure dropped 
to USD 4,929,852 of which USD 2,968,874 was for 
Operations while USD 1,960,978 was for Programmes. 167 Of 
course, there is always a wide margin between approved sums 
and actual releases. Meanwhile, the slim approved for the 
Commission in 20 io was far less than that of the amorphous 
organ called PAP, which approved budget stood at USD 
14,149,250, made up of USD 9,129,736 for Operations and 
USD 5,019,514 for Programmes. 168 Such huge gaps indict a 
165. Viljoen, supra note 34 at 315. 
166. Activity Report 2008, supra note 137at para 38. 
167. Decision on Budget, supra note 154 at para 2. 
168. Ibid. 
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lack of prioritization of needs by the AU. An organization that 
cannot, or will not, fund its vital institutions should not 
complain of external interference. Actually, no judicial or 
quasi-judicial institution is truly independent until it is 
independent of donor funding. As Magliveras opined, 
" [ d]emocracy, the rule of law and the protection of human 
rights are a costly business. None can be achieved on the 
cheap" . 169 
What to Do 
Africa's past experiment with institution building have 
seemingly been based on an evolutionary paradigm, where all 
things evolved in a natural and inexorable process of 
development from simpler to more complex and efficient 
forms, following the principle of "survival of the fittest." The 
thinking has been that, with minimal or no support, Africa's 
institutions will take their destinies in their own hands and 
eventually perfect themselves. Such jaundiced thinking 
explains why many of Africa's key institutions have atrophied, 
lacking strong financial and operational resources from states 
that set them up. In principle, the proposal to merge the two 
· continental judicial institutions is part of the implementation of 
the AU Assembly's decision to rationalize its institutions, 
avoid duplication of mandate, and ensure cost effectiveness 
within the AU. 170 The challenge is how to bring this i long. 
process to a logical end, while also ensuring effective 
169. Konstantinos Magliveras, "The African Union (AU)", ASIL Reports on 
Intemarional Organizations (2010), online: ASIL 
< h((p ://www. asi l. org!riolafricanunion _ 2008. htmlllf oornores > 
170. Elias, "!11rroducro1y Nore", supranote 135 at 334 ("The decision [to merge 
the two Courts] was based on concerns regarding the increasing number of 
African Union institutions and the cost of maintaining them. The main idea 
was to consolidate the limited resources available for a single court"). 
224 The Transnational Human Rights Review 
enforcement of human rights guaranteed in all relevant 
instruments ratified by states parties. This segment is a further 
reflection on some of these issues. 
1. 'Law Speaks Tlzrougli Power' 
The interests that human rights embody are sufficiently strong 
enough to justify the imposition of duties on states. 171 This 
assumption is implicit in the adoption and ratification of human 
rights treaties and in the pactasunctservanda requirement 
arising therefrom, including the obligation to adopt legislative 
and other measures to give effects to ~ese rights at the 
domestic level. This assumption also provides justification for 
complementary international mechanisms to protect human 
rights. 172 An independent court that is sufficiently resourced is 
a more suitable mechanism to interpret . the clusters of legal 
relations and interests involved in human rights and to provide 
effective remedies for their violations, based on the legal 
maxim, ubi jus ibiremedium. Law speaks through power, not 
dialogue. Besides: 
It is against international law and the spirit of African 
solidarity to put African citizens in a situation where they are 
bound by the various Treaties, Protocols, Declarations and 
Decisions made under the ambit of the AU and the RECs, yet 
have no recourse through an independent and impartial 
tribunal, when their rights, guaranteed under the said 
instruments, are violated. 173 
171. Joseph Raz: T71e Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) at 
· 165 et seq. 
172. Pavlos Eleftheriadis: Legal Rights (Oxford, Oxford Univ Press, 2008) 
(offering a general account of legal rights). 
173. Communique of the Inaugural Colloquium of Legal Scholars on the African 
Human Rights System, convened by the Pan African Lawyers Union, in 
Arusha, Tanzania (July 2011), para 9 [PALU Communique} (on file with 
author). 
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To reap the fruits of economic integration envisaged under 
the AU Act,· African states must uphold international rule of 
law. These states bear the primary responsibilities for the 
establishment and proper functioning of the proposed Merged 
Court. These obligations are imperative and positive, entailing 
investing in infrastructure and other resources, including 
personnel, paper, computers, printers, and a functional library. 
The Merged Court, when established, must not be subjected to 
financial ridicule, by allowing it to carry bowels and beg for 
funds from the global community. It should be properly 
resourced so to enable it to face the critical task of human 
rights protection and allied matters. Only an empowered and 
independent court can protect human rights, develop 
international law , strengthen the rule of law, deepen 
democracy, and deal with the many legal and other crises that 
continue to plague Africa. 
2. 'Etenial Vigilance is tile Price of Liberty' 
The endless adoption of protocols with no visible and viable 
court to check impunity is wearisome, but the civil society 
must not give up. Whatever modest progress that Africa has 
made in mainstreaming human rights in regional politics and 
policies has been through relentless struggles by the civil 
society, the main analytical paradigm in African politics. The 
repressive post-colonial governments think first of national 
sovereignty and the personal good of the rnling before they 
consider the cornn1011 good, if at all. The civil society, 
including human rights NGOs, should realise that one victory 
is not, and should never be, the end of the strnggle to enthrone 
accountability in Africa. They should work with governmental 
and other institutional stakeholders to make the court project a 
reality. Africa's governments should be reminded that they' 
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have little to gain by not meeting their international human 
rights commitments. This civil society pressure should run 
concomitantly with human rights monitoring, advocacy, and 
resource assistance. 
Significantly, Africa's inter-governmental orgnisations 
(IGOs) now recognise the role of civil societies in the 
advancement of human rights. The Grand Bay Declaration, 
adopted at the first OAU Ministerial Conference on human 
rights in 1999, 174 acknowledged the positive contributions that 
African NGOs have made in the promotion and protection of 
human rights .175 It recognised the importance of p·romoting an 
African civil society and calls on African governmdnts to offer 
their constructive assistance to these non-state actors in order 
to consolidate democracy and development. 176 A year 
thereafter, the AU Act was adopted, in which States Parties 
promised "to build a partnership between governments and all 
segments of civil society, in particular women, youth and the 
private sector, in order to strengthen solidarity and cohesion 
among our peoples" .177There is, thus, a normative framework 
for civil society's engagements with AU organs. 
Not surprisingly, many indigenous African civil societies, 
like PALU and the Coalition for an Effective African Court, 
have consultative status with the AU Authority. These and 
others should continue to engage the AU organs and Member 
States to ensure that human rights are not lost in the morass of 
endless protocols. Indeed, all Africans must become vigilantes 
for human rights accountability, since eternal vigilance 
remains the price of liberty. 
174. Mauritius OA U Conference on Human Rights, (1999) 36(4) Africa Research 
Bulletin: Political, Social, and Cultural Series 135 [Grand Bay Declaration]. 
· 175. Ibid at preamble. 
l 76. Ibid at para 17. 
177. AU Act, supra note at 68 preamble. 
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Conclusion: Between the Mountain Top and the Promised 
Land 
Africans have wandered for years in the wilderness of 
unfulfilled expectations in the enjoyment of their basic rights 
and freedoms. In the last few years, leaders , who hitherto 
turned their countries into a human rights graveyard, took their 
citizens to the 'Mountain Top' to view the Promised Lan~ 
through the prisms of multiple human rights ~nstruments. The 
African Charter and its supplementary .protocols offered so 
much pro~ise for Africans - promise of dignity, liberty, fair 
trial and rule of law, education, work and social security, 
health and healthy environment, women equality and 
empowerment, political participation and good governance, 
peace, etcetera. However , it is no longer certain how soon 
Africans will enjoy these promises, given that the journey to 
human rights accountability has been a zigzag; one step 
forward, two steps backward - sometimes no movement at all. 
The 1998 Protocolis now almost urrrecognisable due to the 
numerous alterations, re-organisations, re-arrangements, and 
re-enactments pf its provisions. The Human Rights Court faces 
the danger of being lost in transition. 178 
The African human system has the potential to deliver on 
its promise, but that will depend on States Parties' willingness 
to undertake a radical restructuring of its institutional 
mechanism for protection. ·while adopting the Merger 
Protocol, African States expressed the sentiment that, the 
establishment of an African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
shall assist in the achievement of the goals pursued by the 
African Union and that the attainment of the objectives of the 
178. Dan Juma: "Lost (or Found) in Transition - The Anatomy of the New 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights" (2009) 13 Max Planck YBUNL 
267. 
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African Charter . . . requires the establishment of a judicial 
organ to supplement and strengthen the mission of the African 
Corllinission ... as well as the African Committee ... 179 
Agreed! In fact, th~ Court could also contribute towards 
healing a continent torn apart by coups, dictatorships, strife, 
wars, famine, and, above all, genocide. Such a court is 
particularly relevant at a time like this when human rights are 
once again under great strains in Africa, when many states are 
still far from resembling a coherent polity, and when 
politicians are becoming increasingly selfish and cynical. 
. Whether the Court will live up to these great expectations is a 
different matter entirely - optimism· is the motor that drives 
hope, without which there would be despair to fulfil its own 
prophecy of doom. The citizens' immediate concern is how 
and when the AU and its Member States will transit from the 
current Shakespearean dilemma of 'to be or not to be' and turn 
hope into reality . The milk and honey is beyond this 
wilderness. 
179. Merger Protocol. supra note 44 al preamble. 
